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P RE FACE 
One of the tasks of the Food and Agriculture Program at 
IIASA consists of linking together national models through 
international markets for agricultural products. This requires 
in particular to find an economic equilibrium, i.e. to solve a 
system of nonlinear ill-conditioned equations. 
On the other hand, the task "Nonsmooth Optimization" has 
been created in the System and Decision Area to investigate 
modern methods for solving difficult problems of mathematical 
programming, and their possible applications to fields of in- 
terest at IIASA. 
It appeared that these topics are strongly related, one 
could even say that Nonsmooth Optimization seems to be a fruit- 
ful approach for attacking equilibrium problems. Therefore a 
collaborative research has been carried out, whose result is 
now a computer code implemented on PDP 1 1 ,  that finds an equi- 
librium through Nonsmooth Optimization. 
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the feasibility 
and the relative efficiency of this approach. 

In  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economy--i .e .  a  system of importers-  
e x p o r t e r s  who r e a c t  t o  p r i c e s - - e q u i l i b r i u m  can be de f ined  a s  a  
system of p r i c e s  such t h a t  t h e  imports  a r e  no t  l a r g e r  t han  t h e  
expor t s .  Plathematically,  imports  and e x p o r t s  a r e  r a t h e r  com- 
p l i c a t e d  non l inea r  func t ions  of p r i c e s ,  s o  t h a t  f i n d i n g  an equi-  
l i b r ium amounts t o  s o l v i n g  a  non l inea r  system. 
To s o l v e  t h i s  problem, a  technique was s e l e c t e d  which 
o p e r a t e s  by d e f i n i n g  i t e r a t i v e l y  a  sequence of p r i c e  v e c t o r s  
which aim a t  reducing t h e  gap between imports  and e x p o r t s ,  u n t i l  
it i s  below an accep tab le  l e v e l .  
I n  t h i s  paper ,  we g ive  two examples of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
model, o u t l i n e  t h e  methodology adopted,  and r e p o r t  on a  subs tan-  
t i a l  s e t  of numerical  exper iments .  

ABSTRACT 
I n  t h e  f i r s t  s e c t i o n  w e  d e s c r i b e  t h e  problem i n  g e n e r a l  
terms, s e t t i n g  t h e  p r e c i s e  h y p o t h e s i s  i n  ma themat ica l  language.  
S e c t i o n  2 d e s c r i b e s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  of  an  example which a r i s e s  
i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of  t h e  l i n k a g e  o f  n a t i o n a l  models o f  food and 
a g r i c u l t u r e .  The g e n e r a l  methodology i s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  S e c t i o n  3 ,  
where t h e  a l g o r i t h m  of  s o l u t i o n  i s  o u t l i n e d .  S e c t i o n  4 r e p o r t s  
on an e x t e n s i v e  set of  numer ica l  e x p e r i m e n t s ,  b o t h  on problems 
known i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e ,  and on t h e  example o f  S e c t i o n  2 .  
F i n a l l y  t h e  paper  conc ludes  by some remarks abou t  improvements 
of  t h e  a l g o r i t h m ,  which m o t i v a t e  f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h  on t h e  s u b j e c t  

Computing Economic E q u i l i b r i a  Through Nonsmooth Opt imiza t ion  
1. The Problem 
L e t  P ~ I - . ~ P ,  be n  nonnega t ive  v a r i a b l e s  which a r e  r e q u i r e d  
t o  sum up t o :  
These v a r i a b l e s  a r e  c a l l e d  p r i c e s ,  and w e  d e n o t e  by S  t h e  se t  o f  
p r i c e  v e c t o r s  p  which s a t i s f y  ( 1 ) .  To t h e s e  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  a s -  
s o c i a t e d  n  f u n c t i o n s  z , ( p ) ,  ..., z n ( p ) ,  c a l l e d  e x c e s s  demands, 
which s a t i s f y  t h e  r e l a t i o n  
known a s  Walras ' law. 
The problem i s  t o  f i n d  a  v e c t o r  ~ E S  such  t h a t  
A s o l u t i o n  t o  t h i s  problem i s  c a l l e d  an  e q u i l i b r i u m .  From 
( 1 )  and ( 2 ) ,  i.t i s  c l e a r  t h a t ,  f o r  any p  E S ,  a l l  t h e  z i ( p )  c a n n o t  
be  s t r i c t l y  n e g a t i v e .  T h e r e f o r e  it i s  a b s o l u t e l y  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  
f i n d  an e x a c t  e q u i l i b r i u m - -  a t  l e a s t  when t h e  problem i s  non- 
l i n e a r - -  and w e  must be c o n t e n t  i f  w e  f i n d  a  ~ E S  such  t h a t  
f o r  some p r e s c r i b e d  s m a l l  p o s i t i v e  t o l e r a n c e s  ci .  
I n  S e c t i o n  3 ,  w e  s u g g e s t  a  methodology which can  be a p p l i e d  
t o  s o l v e  ( 4 ) ,  prov ided  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  fundamenta l  assumpt ions  a r e  
s a t i s f i e d :  
(i) For any p E S  such t h a t  pi > 0 i = 1 ,  ..., n ,  each z i ( p )  
h a s  a  u n i q u e l y  d e f i n e d  v a l u e ,  w h i c h  i s  a  c o n t i n u o u s  
f u n c t i o n  o f  p .  
(ii) For any  p  E S  s u c h  t h a t  pi > 0 i = 1 , .  . n ,  t h e r e  
k  
e x i s t s  a  s e q u e n c e  p  t S,  p k + p  s u c h  t h a t  t h e  g r a d i e n t s  
k  Vzi ( p  ) e x i s t  and a r e  b o u n d e d .  
W e  t h u s  r e q u i r e  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  compute t h e  g r a d i e n t s  when- 
e v e r  t h e y  e x i s t - - w h i c h  may n o t  be  a  t r i v i a l  t a s k .  Moreover, 
w e  need t h e  z i ( p )  t o  have a  "semismoothness" p r o p e r t y  which, due 
t o  i t s  t e c h n i c a l  n a t u r e ,  i s  n o t  d e f i n e d  h e r e ,  b u t  can  be  found 
i n  [ 81 and [ 91 . 
Hence, (i) r u l e s  o u t  problems i n  which z ( p )  i s  a  m u l t i -  
v a l u e d  mapping" For  t h i s  k i n d  o f  problem, t h e r e  e x i s t s  o n l y  one 
a l g o r i t h m  [ I 1 1  f o r  f i n d i n g  an  e q u i l i b r i u m .  -Our aim i s  t o  compete 
w i t h  t h i s  a l g o r i t h m  i n  t h e  e a s i e r  c a s e  o f  c o n t i n u o u s  e x c e s s  
demands. I f  t h e  e x c e s s  demand i s  a d m i t t e d  t o  be c o n t i n u o u s ,  t h e n  
t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  d i f f e r e n t i a b i l i t y  hypo theses  a r e  n o t  much more 
r e s t r i c t i v e .  I n  f a c t ,  t h e y  a r e  o n l y  v i o l a t e d  by s t r a n g e  ( f rom 
t h e  p o i n t  o f  view o f  a p p l i c a t i o n s )  f u n c t i o n s  such  a s  
2  1 
z ( p )  = p  s i n -  f o r  P E R .  
P  
The methodology w e  propose  i s  s t r o n g l y  r e l a t e d  t o ,  and com- 
p a r a b l e  w i t h ,  Newton [ 1 ,121 o r  quasi-Newton [ 131 methods. However, 
s i n c e  w e  do n o t  r e q u i r e  t h e  q r a d i e n t s  t o  be  c o n t i n u o u s ,  t h e  f i e l d  
o f  a p g l i c a b i l i t y  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  l a r g e r .  P - l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  t h e  
p r e s e n t  a2proach can be found i n  [2 ]  and [ 3 ] .  
2. An Example 
Simple economic examples which f i t  i n t o  t h e  above framework 
can  be found i n  [ I l l .  However, t h i s  s t u d y  was m o t i v a t e d  by a  
problem which i s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  more complex. W e  g i v e  a  s i m p l i -  
f i e d  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  it h e r e ,  and refer t h e  i n t e r e s t e d  r e a d e r  t o  
[4]  f o r  a  more comple te  d e s c r i p t i o n  from t h e  economic p o i n t  o f  
view. I t  i s  a  model o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e ,  w i t h  which i s  con- 
s i d e r e d  t h e  l i n k a g e  o f  n a t i o n a l  models hav ing  domes t i c  p r i c e  
p o l i c i e s  and q u o t a s  on i m p o r t s  and e x p o r t s .  
The v e c t o r  z ( p )  o f  e x c e s s  demands f o r  n  commodities i s  t h e  
j sum o v e r  j = I ,  ..., m of  n a t i o n a l  e x c e s s  demand v e c t o r s  z  ( p ) .  
j Each coun t ry  d e t e r m i n e s  i t s  own e x c e s s  demand z  ( p )  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  
o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e  v e c t o r  p ,  t h r o u g h  a  r a t h e r  compl ica ted  
p r o c e s s .  To s i m p l i f y  n o t a t i o n ,  w e  d r o p  t h e  s u p e r s c r i p t  j and 
d e s c r i b e  t h e  b e h a v i o r  o f  one c o u n t r y .  
The c o u n t r y  c o n t a i n s  s e v e r a l  income c l a s s e s  ( indexed  by h ) ,  
e a c h  of  which i s  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  an i n d i v i d u a l  consumer, s o  t h a t  
t h e  n a t i o n a l  e x c e s s  demand f o r  commodity i is  g i v e n  by 
h  I n  t h i s  n o t a t i o n ,  x  d e n o t e s  t h e  consumption,  whereas yi i s  
t h e  q u a n t i t y  of  commodity i owned by t h e  income c l a s s  h  a f t e r  
p r o d u c t i o n .  Although economies w i t h  p r o d u c t i o n  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  
p r i c e s  can  be c o n s i d e r e d ,  w e  res t r ic t  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  t o  a  s i m p l e r  
example i n  which t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  and ownership  o f  commodities 
i s  g i v e n ,  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  exchange  economy. T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  numbers 
h  y2 a r e  f i x e d ,  and it i s  t h e  b e h a v i o r  o f  t h e  consumption l e v e l s  x i ,  
a s  f u n c t i o n s  o f  p ,  which must be  d e s c r i b e d .  
The consumptions depend on p  th rough  two k i n d s  o f  i n t e r -  
med ia te  pa ramete r s :  t h o s e  which a r e  n a t i o n a l ,  i .e .  common t o  a l l  
income c l a s s e s ,  and t h o s e  which a r e  s p e c i f i c  t o  e a c h  income c l a s s .  
W e  beg in  w i t h  t h e  n a t i o n a l  p a r a m e t e r s .  
F i r s t  t h e r e  a r e  g i v e n  q u o t a s  i n s i d e  which t h e  n a t i o n a l  e x c e s s  
demands must l i e ,  which c r e a t e  c o n s t r a i n t s  o f  t h e  t y p e  
The f o l l o w i n g  b a s i c  n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n  e x p r e s s e s  t h a t  t h e  
b a l a n c e  o f  t r a d e  c o n d i t i o n  i s  s a t i s f i e d :  
where k i s  a  f u n c t i o n  (one f o r  e a c h  c o u n t r y )  c o n t i n u o u s  and 
j homogenous o f  d e g r e e  1 ;  moreover  l k  ( p )  = 0 .  Hence ( 2 )  h o l d s .  
j 
The income c l a s s e s  are n o t  d i r e c t l y  c o n f r o n t e d  w i t h  t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e s  p i ,  b u t  r a t h e r  w i t h  effective domestic 
prices pe i .  By means o f  t a r i f f s  a t  t h e  b o r d e r ,  t h e  government  
t r i e s  t o  make pe  = p d ,  a  desi1,ecl price v e c t o r ,  which s h o u l d  
f o l l o w  p  a c c o r d i n g  t o  a  g i v e n  adjustment rule 
e a c h  Fi b e i n g  a d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  and  h o m o t h e t i c  f u n c t i o n .  
However, t h e  e q u a l i t y  p e  = pd = F ( p )  may n o t  b e  r e a l i z a b l e ,  
b e c a u s e  o f  q u o t a s .  T h e r e  i s  a d e v i a t i o n  between p e  and  p d ,  which  
can  b e  r o u g h l y  e x p l a i n e d  as f o l l o w s  
* if b o t h  o f  t h e  bounds i n  t h e  i t h  c o n s t r a i n t  ( 5 )  are 
i n a c t i v e ,  t h e n  pe i  = pdi ;  
* i f  a  bound i s  a c t i v e ,  t h e n  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  consumpt ion  
i s  n o t  f r e e ,  and  t h e r e  i s  a  shadow price difference X i ,  
which  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  m a r g i n a l  " c o s t "  o f  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  
c o n s t r a i n t .  I f  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  i s  a c t u a l l y  lh X! = Ui  
( r e s p .  lh X: = Li) t h e n  hi i s  p o s i t i v e  ( r e s p .  n e g a t i v e ) ;  
and  i f  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  i s  i n a c t i v e  X i  = 0 .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
w e  w r i t e  
( I n  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  o f  a s i n g l e  income c l a s s ,  t h e  p rob lem o f  
comput ing  x r e d u c e s  t o  a n  o p t i m i z a t i o n  problem.  I f  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  
pd = p ,  t h e n  t h e  above  r e l a t i o n s  are j u s t  t h e  Kuhn-Tucker 
e q u a t i o n s .  ) 
W e  now t u r n  t o  t h e  i n c o m e -  c l a s s  s p e c i f i c  a s p e c t s .  Each 
income class  w i l l  h a v e  t o  s a t i s f y  an  e q u a t i o n  s i m i l a r  t o  ( 6 ) ,  
h 
r e l a t i n g  pei and xi .  S i n c e  pe  # p ,  t h i s  e q u a t i o n  becomes t h e  
s o - c a l l e d  budget equation: 
where th i s  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  income c l a s s  h  t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
n income t a r  t = lht . I t  i s  c o n v e n i e n t  t o  set  
a h  b e i n g  d e t e r m i n e d  by a  s y s t e m  o f  t a x a t i o n .  V a r i o u s  s u c h  
s y s t e m s  a r e  p o s s i b l e ,  f o r  example:  
h  1 .  a  depends  o n l y  on h.  
h  h h  h  h  3 .  a s u c h  t h a t  ( l i p e i y i + t  ) / ( l i I h p e i y i + t )  = B  g i v e n .  
F i n a l l y ,  when p e  and  t are f i x e d ,  ( 9 )  r e d u c e s  t o  a s y s t e m  
h  
o f  l i n e a r  e q u a t i o n s  i n  x i ,  and  e a c h  income c l a s s  c h o o s e s  a  con- 
h  
sumpt ion  v e c t o r  which  maximizes  i t s  own u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  u  , 
i . e. which  s o l v e s  
h h  h  
max u  ( x l , .  . . , x n )  
( 1 0 )  
W e  assume t h a t  e a c h  problem ( 1 0 )  h a s  a  u n i q u e  nonnegat i 've  
s o l u t i o n ,  which is  t h e  c a s e  i f  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  s t r i c t l y  
h  
concave  and t h e  income 1 pei  y? + a  t i s  s t r i c t l y  p o s i t i v e .  
i 
Suppose now t h a t  a n  i n d e x  s e t  I C  l l ,  ..., n )  is  g i v e n  s u c h  
t h a t  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  ( 5 )  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  b e  a c t i v e  f o r  i €1. 
Then t h e  government  h a s  t o  f i n d  a  v a l u e  o f  t h e  t a x  p a r a m e t e r  t ,  
which g e n e r a t e s  a  s y s t e m  o f  p r i c e s  p e l  s u c h  t h a t  t h e  s o l u t i o n s  
o f  ( 1 0 )  s a t i s f y  e q u a t i o n  ( 6 )  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  e q u a l i t i e s  ( 5 )  f o r  
7- 
i E I .  Of c o u r s e ,  t h e r e  i s  no  r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  ( 5 )  t o  
b e  s a t i s f i e d  f o r  i y I ,  u n l e s s  I h a s  been  p r o p e r l y  chosen .  
I n  summary, comput ing  z ( p )  amounts t o  i t e r a t i n g  o v e r  I and 
t s u c h  t h a t  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  d e f i n e d  by ( 6 )  and (1 0 )  s a t i s f i e s  
( 5 ) .  The e x i s t e n c e  o f  s u c h  an  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  s t u d i e d  i n  [4] 
where ,  f o r  s p e c i f i c  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s ,  u n i q u e n e s s  h a s  been  shown, 
and  a l g o r i t h m s  h a v e  been  g i v e n  t o  compute z ( p )  and  t h e  J a c o b i a n  
azi  
- . T h i s  c o m p u t a t i o n  h a s  been r e a l i z e d  a s  a  FORTRAN program 
api 
(whichwe w i l l  n o t  t r y  t o  d e s c r i b e  h e r e ! )  W e  s i m p l y  p o i n t  o u t  
t h a t  t h e  J a c o b i a n  i s  d i s c o n t i n u o u s  a t  v e c t o r s  p  s u c h  t h a t  f o r  
some c o u n t r y  t h e  se t  o f  a c t i v e  c o n s t r a i n t s  ( 5 )  s w i t c h e s .  
3 .  The Methodoloqy 
The i d e a  f o r  s o l v i n g  ( 3 )  i s  t o  choose  a  n o n n e g a t i v e  goal 
function f ( p ) ,  which measu res  how f a r  p  i s  .from an  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  
and  which i s  z e r o  i f  and  o n l y  i f  p  i s  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m .  Then t h e  
p rob lem i s  r e d u c e d  t o  
min f  ( p )  
{ p € s  
i . e .  a  c o n s t r a i n e d  o p t i m i z a t i o n  p rcb lem.  S i n c e  S  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
s i m p l e ,  and  s i n c e  one  i s  g e n e r a l l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  p rob lems  where 
t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e s  are a l l  n o n z e r o ,  w e  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  con- 
s t r a i n t s  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t e c h n i q u e :  
F i r s t  add  t o  f  a ba~>r~ie~> function Q ( p )  which i s  p o s i t i v e  
f o r  any  p € S ,  and  which  t e n d s  t o  +a when p  a p p r o a c h e s  t h e  
boundary  o f  S.  I t  i s  c o n v e n i e n t  t o  set  Q ( p )  = C i  q  (p i )  where  
10 i f  t > 6 
- 
Thus ,  t h e  a c t u a l  f  ( p )  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  o n l y  when e a c h  pi i s  g r e a t e r  
-4 t h a n  6 ( and  w e  c a n  c h o o s e  f o r  example 6 = 10 . T h i s  e l i m i n a t e s  
t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  pi 1 0. W e  now change  n o t a t i o n  and d e n o t e  by  
f  ( p )  t h e  f u n c t i o n  f  ( p )  + Q ( p )  . 
To e l i m i n a t e  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  lpi = 1 ,  w e  c o n s i d e r  t h e  re- 
s t r i c t i o n  o f  f  t o  t h e  set  { p l p i  = 1 ) .  T h i s  r e s t r i c t e d  f u n c t i o n  
h a s  a g r a d i e n t  whose components  gi  sum up t o  0 ,  and  a r e  g i v e n  by 
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f o r m u l a  : 
I t  xemains  t o  s p e c i f y  t h e  g o a l  f u n c t i o n .  F i r s t ,  t h e  e x c e s s  
demands s h o u l d  b e  m u t u a l l y  comparable .  T h i s  l e a d s  u s  t o  con- 
s i d e r  t h e  s c a l e d  e x c e s s  demands 
where  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  a i ( p )  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  s a t i s f y  
The p r o p e r  c h o i c e  of  a i ( p )  depends  on  t h e  p rob lem c o n s i d e r e d .  
I n  view o f  ( 4 ) ,  w e  c a n  choose  
a i ( p )  = I / € i  i .e .  c o n s t a n t  c o e f f i c i e n t s .  
I t  is  also p o s s i b l e  t o  c h o o s e  
where  a E ] 0 , 1 [  and  p i s  some s t r i c t l y  p o s i t i v e  f i x e d  v e c t o r  i n  
S f  which  i s  h o p e f u l l y  n o t  f a r  from t h e  d e s i r e d  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
F o r  t h e  example  o f  S e c t i o n  2 ,  a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s u i t a b l e  c h o i c e  
would b e  
j where z i  ( p )  i s  t h e  e x c e s s  demand o f  t h e  j t h  c o u n t r y .  However, 
w e  d o  n o t  s t u d y  f u r t h e r  t h i s  c h o i c e ,  which p r e s e n t s  some com- 
p u t a t i o n a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  
Once e a c h  e x c e s s  demand i s  s c a l e d ,  v a r i o u s  g o a l  f u n c t i o n s  
a r e  p o s s i b l e .  
f  ( p )  = maxi z '  ( p )  i which i s  t h e  most  n a t u r a l  one  
f ( p )  = li max ( o 1 z j ( p ) )  
f  ( p )  = li [max ( 0  ,z: ( p )  ) ] which  i s  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  
i f  e v e r y  z j ( p )  i s  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e .  
Suppose f o r  example  w e  choose  
(The o t h e r  c h o i c e s  a r e  s i m p l e  v a r i a n t s . )  T h i s  f u n c t i o n  h a s  a  
g r a d i e n t  o n l y  when p  i s  s u c h  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  e x a c t l y  o n e  i s u c h  
t h a t  zi ( p )  /c i  i s  maximum, and  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  g r a d i e n t  Vzi ( p )  
e x i s t s .  O t h e r w i s e  w e  s p e a k  o f  a  g e n e r a l i z e d  g r a d i e n t .  The com- 
p u t a t i o n  o f  f and a  g e n e r a l i z e d  g r a d i e n t  i s  s i m p l y  d e s c r i b e d  by 
1 .  Check t h a t  a l l  p r i c e s  a r e  p o s i t i v e .  compute t h e  , e x c e s s  
demands and  t h e i r  ( g e n e r a l i z e d )  g r a d i e n t s .  
2. Determine  some i n d e x  i s u c h  t h a t  z ~ / E ~  i s  maximum.   his 
g i v e s  f  and  a  ( g e n e r a l i z e d )  g r a d i e n t  g .  
3 .  I f  n e c e s s a r y ,  add  t o  f  and  g  t h e  b a r r i e r  t e r m s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
t o  ( 1 1 ) .  
4 .  S u b s t r a c t  f rom g  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  t e r m  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  ( 1 2 ) .  
To min imize  f ,  w e  j u s t  a p p l y  some method f o r  nonsmooth 
o p t i m i z a t i o n  d e s c r i b e d  i n  [ 9 ] .  Every  s u c h  method i s  b a s e d  on 
t h e  u s u a l  p r i n c i p l e  o f  d e s c e n t  m e t h o d s  [ 5 1 ,  i n  which  a  d i r e c t i o n  
d  o f  i n c r e m e n t a t i o n  o f  p r i c e s  i s  computed f rom t h e  c u r r e n t  i t e r a t e  
p ,  and t h e n  a  l i n e - s e a r c h  i s  performed i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n ,  hope- 
f u l l y  p r o v i d i n g  a  s t e p s i z e  t such t h a t  f  ( p  + t d )  < f  ( p )  . The 
common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of  t h e s e  methods i s  t h a t  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  i s  
computed th rough  a  q u a d r a t i c  programming problem i n v o l v i n g  t h e  
g r a d i e n t s  accumula ted  d u r i n g  t h e  p r e v i o u s  i t e r a t i o n s .  W e  can 
d e s c r i b e  t h e i r  g e n e r a l  scheme b r i e f l y  a s  f o l l o w s .  
ALGORITHM 1 
1  S t e p  1 .  Suppose k  i t e r a t e s  p  , . . . ,pk have been g e n e r a t e d ,  and 
t h e  cor respond ing  g r a d i e n t s  have been s t o r e d  i n  t h e  bundle 
S t e p  2 .  According t o  some d e l e t i o n  r u l e ,  s e l e c t  an i n d e x  set  
K C t 1  ,... , k} .  
k  S t e p  3 .  Find t h e  v e c t o r  d  of  minimal l e n g t h  among t h e  convex 
combinat ions  
k  S t e p  4 .  Perform a  J i n e - s e a r c h  a l o n g  -d t o  f i n d  t h e  s t e p s i z e  
t > 0 and t h e  n e x t  g r a d i e n t  g  k  k+ l  = Vf (pk - t d  ) such  t h a t  
k  k  k  
- e i t h e r  f  ( p  - t d  ) < f  ( p  ) ( s e r i o u s  s t e p ) .  Then s e t  
pk+l  = pk - t d  k  
- o r  t i s  s m a l l  enough ( n u l l  s t e p ) .  Then s e t  p  k+ 1  k  = p .  
S t e p  5. I n c r e a s e  k  by 1 and go t o  S t e p  1 .  
I n  S t e p  2 t h e  d e l e t i o n  r u l e  can be used i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t o  
r educe  t h e  s i z e  of  t h e  bundle  when it becomes t o o  l a r g e  f o r  t h e  
a l l o c a t e d  computer memory. 
Under t h e  hypo theses  l i s t e d  i n  S e c t i o n  1 ,  t h e  a l g o r i t h m  can 
be implemented. Whether t h e  sequence pk converges  t o  an  equ i -  
l i b r i u m  i s  i n  g e n e r a l  a  m a t t e r  of  chance ,  b u t  w e  can s t a t e  con- 
vergence  a t  l e a s t  under  some c l a s s i c a l  hypo theses  [ I ] .  
THEOREM 1 
Suppose f  i s  g i v e n  by ( 1 3 ) .  Then t h e  above  a l g o r i t h m  pro-  
d u c e s  an  e q u i l i b r i u m  u n d e r  e i t h e r  o f  t h e  two f o l l o w i n g  a s s u m p t i o n s .  
(i) Each z i ( p )  i s  semiconvex [ 8 ]  ( o r  more s i m p l y :  convex)  
(ii) When p  a p p r o a c h e s  t h e  boundary o f  S ,  a t  l e a s t  one  
z .  ( p )  g o e s  t o  +m. Each zi  ( p )  i s  a  c o n t i n u o u s l y  d i f -  
1 
f e r e n t i a b l e  f u n c t i o n ,  p o s i t i v e l y  homogenous o f  d e g r e e  0 :  
zi ( p p )  = zi ( p )  t ry  > 0. Any s u b s e t  o f  a t  most  n  - 1  
g r a d i e n t s  Vzi ( p )  i s  l i n e a r l y  i n d e p e n d e n t .  
PROOF. (i) i s  j u s t  C o r o l l a r y  5 . 3  o f  [ 91 . 
n  
n  Now assume (i i) .  F o r  p  and  q  i n  R , d e n o t e  ( p , q )  = 1 p i q i  
i = l  t h e  u s u a l  s c a l a r  p r o d u c t .  L e t  ~ E S  be s u c h  t h a t  pi - > 6 
i = 1  , . . . , n .  L e t  I ( p )  be t h e  i n d e x  set  s u c h  t h a t  zi  ( p )  / E ~  i s  
maximum f o r  i E I ( p )  . Accord ing  t o  (1  1 ) , ( 13)  t h e  g e n e r a l i z e d  
g r a d i e n t s  o f  f  a t  p  a r e  t h e  v e c t o r s  o f  t h e  form 
where  U E R "  i s  t h e  v e c t o r  whose a l l  components  a r e  1 .  
W e  d e f i n e  a s t a t i o n a r y  p o i n t  o f  f  a s  a  p o i n t  s u c h  t h a t  t h e r e  
e x i s t s  a  convex  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  g e n e r a l i z e d  g r a d i e n t s  which v a n i s h e s .  
Theorem 5.2 o f  [ 9 ]  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  a l g o r i t h m  p r o d u c e s  s u c h  a  
k 
s t a t i o n a r y  p o i n t  p. Because  o f  (ii) and s i n c e  f  ( p  ) i s  nonin-  
c r e a s i n g ,  w e  may s u p p o s e  t h a t  pi 2 6 .  Then f rom (14)  t h e  s t a -  
t i o n a r i t y  o f  5 means t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t  A i  - > 0  E I ( , A i  n o t  a l l  
z e r o ,  s u c h  t h a t  
1  W e  now show t h a t  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  ;; 1 - ( A  ( p )  u )  i s  z e r o .  
i E I  ( P I  - 
C a l l  t h i s  c o e f f i c i e n t  a .  I n  ( 1 5 ) ,  w e  have  a  v e c t o r  o f  R" which 
i s  z e r o .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i t s  s c a l a r  p r o d u c t  w i t h  p i s  a l s o  z e r o :  
Observe t h a t  ( u , p )  = I F i  = 1 .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  t h e  homogenei ty  
o f  zi i m p l i e s  t h a t  (Vz i (p )  ,p) = 0  ( E u l e r  r e l a t i o n ) ,  s o  t h a t  w e  
g e t  a = 0.  T h e r e f o r e  ( 1 5 )  can  b e  w r i t t e n  
From t h e  independency  a s sumpt ion  i n  (ii) ,  t h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  
I (6) c o n t a i n s  n  v e c t o r s .  F i n a l l y  w e  have  p roved  t h a t  a t  p, a l l  
t h e  s c a l e d  e x c e s s  demands a r e  e q u a l .  Because  o f  W a l r a s '  Law, 
t h i s  means t h a t  t h e y  a r e  a c t u a l l y  z e r o .  Q . E . D .  
T h i s  i s  a  theo rem o f  g l o b a l  conve rgence ,  which r e q u i r e s  a  
g l o b a l  a s sumpt ion  on t h e  independency  o f  t h e  g r a d i e n t s .  Of c o u r s e  
t h e r e  a r e  l o c a l  a n a l o g u e s  which s t a t e  t h a t  conve rgence  is  e n s u r e d  
I p r o v i d e d  t h e  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  p  i s  c l o s e  enough t o  an  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
Suppose f o r  example t h a t ,  f o r  any s t a t i o n a r y  p o i n t  p which i s  
n o t  an  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  o n e  h a s  f ( 5 )  - > m >  0.  Then t h e  a l g o r i t h m  con- 
1 
v e r g e s  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  f ( p  ) < m .  Note a l s o  t h a t  t h i s  t heo rem 
n e g l e c t s  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  p e n a l t y  f u n c t i o n ,  which i s  supposed  
t o  b e  e v e n t u a l l y  i n a c t i v e  d u r i n g  t h e  a l g o r i t h m .  
The r e a s o n  why w e  d o  n o t  g i v e  a  t h e o r e m  o f  conve rgence  f o r  
t h e  g e n e r a l  c a s e  where t h e  e x c e s s  demands a r e  n o t  differentiable 
( s u c h  as i n  S e c t i o n  2 )  o r  w i t h  o t h e r  g o a l  f u n c t i o n s ,  i s  b e c a u s e  
t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a  s t a t i o n a r y  p o i n t  i s  t h e n  much more t e c h n i c a l .  
W e  c a n  j u s t  s a y  t h a t  i n  p r a c t i c a l  examples  ( a s  i n  S e c t i o n  2  w i t h  a  
s i g n i f i c a n t  number o f  c o u n t r i e s ) ,  conve rgence  t o  a  wrong p o i n t  i s  
r a t h e r  u n l i k e l y .  
4 .  Numer ica l  R e s u l t s  
The a l g o r i t h m  o f  S e c t i o n  3 c a n  be  i l l u s t r a t e d  w i t h  t h e  
examples  o f  [ l l ] ,  i n  which  t h r e e  t e s t  problems i n v o l v i n g  n  = 5 , 8 , 1 0  
r e s p e c t i v e l y  a r e  g i v e n .  F o r  e a c h  t e s t  problem,  w e  made 6 r u n s ;  
w i t h  t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  g o a l  f u n c t i o n s ,  and two d i f f e r e n t  s t a r t i n g  
p r i c e  v e c t o r s :  
GOAL 1  i s  f ( p )  = maxi z i  ( P )  
GOAL 2  i s  f ( p )  = maxi( Z i / l jw i  j )  ( c f .  [ 1 1  1 f o r  t h e  m e a n i n g  
of Wii ) 
2 
GOAL 3  i s  f  ( p )  = li pi I z i  ( p )  I . 
1  START 1  i s  pi = - 
n  i = l , . . . , n  
START 2  i s  close t o  ( 1 , 0 ,  ..., 0 )  w h i c h  i s  t h e  s t a r t i n g  
p o i n t  of S c a r f ' s  a l q o r i t h m .  
E a c h  t e s t  i s  t h e n  r u n  u n t i l  t h e  maximum excess d e m a n d  i s  
reduced t o  t he  f i n a l  maximum excess d e m a n d  o b t a i n e d  b y  S c a r f  [ I l l .  
T a b l e  1 gives  t h e  c o m p a r i s o n  i n  t e r m s  of t h e  n u m b e r  of evalua- 
t i o n s  required ( e v a l u a t i o n  of t h e  excess d e m a n d  f o r  S c a r f ,  of 
t h e  excess d e m a n d  a n d  i t s  J a c o b i a n  f o r  t h e  p r e s e n t  a l g o r i t h m . )  
T a b l e  1  
Max E.D. 
F i n a l  
[I11 
S c a r f  
best [ 131 
GOAL 1  
GOAL 2  
GOAL 3  
Max E.D. 
I n i t i a l  
n = 5  
. 0 2  
1 5 8  
7 7  
2 7 + 1 7 ( ' )  5 2  
3  1  5 2  
2  6 ( 2 )  
2 0 . 2  9 8 .  
START1 START2 
n = 8  
. 0 7  
6 4 0  
1 0 4  
3 5  6 5  
3 5  6 8  
6 8  ( 2  
9 . 8  4 4 .  
START1 START2 
n  = 1 0  
. 04  
4 6 8  
1 2  1  
5 7 + 2 6 ( ' )  9 0  
5 0  9 3  
6 0  ( 2  
2 7 .  31  8 .  
START1 START2 
( 1 )  The a l g o r i t h m  conve rged  t o  a  " c r i t i c a l  p o i n t "  where  (n-1)  
e x c e s s  demands w e r e  e q u a l  ( t h e  n t h  b e i n g  n e g a t i v e ) .  However, 
t h e  c u r e  was s i m p l e :  it s u f f i c e d  t o  r e s t a r t - - i . e .  t o  c l e a n  up 
t h e  i n d e x  set K i n  S t e p  2. 
( 2 )  I t  conve rged  t o  a  l o c a l  optimum n e a r  t h e  boundary  o f  S ,  
which  w e  c o u l d  n o t  jump. T h i s  shows t h a t  u s i n g  p r i c e s  t o  s c a l e  
t h e  e x c e s s  demands u s  u n s a f e  b e c a u s e  t h e  g o a l  f u n c t i o n  may n o t  
go t o  +a n e a r  t h e  boundary  o f  S ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  b a r r i e r  i s  a c t i v e  
and  may i n t r o d u c e  l o c a l  o p t i m a .  
W e  t u r n  now t o  t h e  example o f  S e c t i o n  2 .  W e  h a v e  chosen  an 
economy w i t h  15 commodi t i e s ,  3 c o u n t r i e s ,  and  e a c h  c o u n t r y  h a s  
10 income classes. The u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  h a v e  t h e  form 
F o r  e a c h  c o u n t r y ,  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  t a x a t i o n  i s  t h e  t h i r d  o n e ,  
h  
a l l  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  f3 b e i n g  0 .1 .  
The t h i r d  c o u n t r y  i s  a  v e r y  s m a l l  one  wh ich ,  i n  t h i s  
e x e r c i s e ,  s e r v e s  a s  a b a r r i e r  f u n c t i o n  ( t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  p r i c e s  
f rom g o i n g  t o  z e r o )  s o  t h a t ,  f o r  t h i s  t h i r d  c o u n t r y ,  t h e  a d j u s t -  
ment r u l e  f o r  t h e  d e s i r e d  d o m e s t i c  p r i c e s  i s  i n  f a c t  pdi = pi 
i = 1 ,  ..., 15.  F o r  t h e  f i r s t  two c o u n t r i e s  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  r u l e  
h a s  t h e  form 
where  t h e  exchange  r a t e  r i s  1  and  t h e  v e c t o r  6 i s  
[ 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 2 , 1 , 5 0 , 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 . 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 ]  f o r  b o t h  c o u n t r i e s .  
W e  have  d e f i n e d  s e v e r a l  t e s t  prob lems ,  t a k i n g  d i f f e r e n t  
v a l u e s  f o r  t h e  d e g r e e s  o f  f r e e  t r a d e  ci 
TEST 1  ci = 1  i = 1 ,  ..., 15 f o r  c o u n t r i e s  1  and  2  
TEST 2 ci = 0 . 5  11 I I  II I I  II 
TEST 3 ci = 0.1  I1 II I1 II 11 
TEST 4 F i r s t  c o u n t r y  : 
'i =I1 i > 7 
1  i < 10 
- 
Second c o u n t r y :  ci ={ 
0  i > 10 
h h  The o t h e r  d a t a  y i ,  ei, Lit  Ui f o r  e a c h  c o u n t r y  are g i v e n  o n  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  p a g e s .  F o r  e a c h  t es t  w e  r a n  t h e  a l g o r i t h m  w i t h  t h r e e  
g o a l  f u n c t i o n s  
GOAL 1  : t o  min imize  f (p) = max z i  ( p )  /yi 
15 
GOAL 2 :  t o  min imize  f  ( p )  = 1 max ( O , z i ( p ) )  
i= 1
15 
 GOAL^: t o m i n i m i z e  f ( p )  = max ( O t z i ( p ) ) / y i  
i =  1  
(where yi  i s  t h e  t o t a l  endowment: j h )  Y i = . I  y i -  j = l  h=l  
Budget p r o p o r t i o n s  e ( i , h )  ( X 180 ) 
Plinimux n a t i o n a l  consumptions L ( i )  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
Faxirum n a t i o n a l  consumptions U ( i )  
1 Q B  38 2 0 8  2 0  36  9 8  P 0  2 @ 0  2 0 8  ? 8 3  2 0 0  2 8 0  2 0 0  4Q8 4 6 6  
Endowments y (i , h )  
Rudget proportions e(i,h) ( X 1 0 0  ) 
Minimun national consumptions L(i) 
O B 0 0 0 E O @ C ' J f l 8 B B k ? 0  
P'aximum national consumptions U (i) 
Fnclowments y ( i  , h )  
Fudget p ropo r t i ons  e ( i , h )  ( X 1 0 0  ) 
Mininum n a t i o n a l  consumptions L ( i )  
0 8 f i f i 0 0 f l B C ! ! ? C 3 G B P  
!!axinurn n a t i o n a l  consumptions IJ ( i )  
908 9e8  9 8 0  99K' 9 8 8  9 0 6  9 C O  9 4 8  9G0 9 9 0  93fl 9 4 8  9 0 9  9 8 0  
I n  e a c h  r u n ,  t h e  i t e r a t i o n s  were s topped  a s  soon a s  each  
e x c e s s  demand zi was less t h a n  1 %  o f  t h e  t o t a l  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
e n d 0 ~ r n e n t . y ~ .  The s t a r t i n g  v a l u e  f o r  t h e  wor ld  v e c t o r  p r i c e  
1  
was always pi = - 15'  
T a b l e  2 below summarizes t h e  r e s u l t s .  For e a c h  of t h e  5  
t es t s ,  w e  g i v e  t h e  maximum i n i t i a l  e x c e s s  demand, and f o r  each  
o f  t h e  15 r u n s ,  w e  g i v e  t h e  f i n a l  maximum e x c e s s  demand and t h e  
t o t a l  number o f  f u n c t i o n - g r a d i e n t  e v a l u a t i o n s .  Note t h a t  t h e  
e x c e s s  demands i n  t h i s  model can  be shown t o  be "semi-smooth". 
TABLE 2 
(')c£. N o t e  (1) b e l o w  T a b l e  1. 
Max E.D. 
I n i t i a l  
GOAL 1 
Max E.D. 

















/I e va l  F i n a l  
8 1 1.25 




Max E.D.  
/I e val  F i n a l  
4 8 5.81 
9 6 1.8 
1 2 1  1.3 
2 13 12.3 
4 3 4.5 
L 
5. A New Technique f o r  Minimax Problems 
Minimizing t h e  maximum excess  demand c o n s i s t s  i n  s o l v i n g  
( 3 )  a s  a  minimax problem, f o r  which a  s p e c i a l  method e x i s t s  [ 4 1 .  
B a s i c a l l y ,  it proceeds a s  i n  Algorithm 1 ( f o r  t h e  g o a l  func t ion  
j  f  ( p )  = max z i  ( p )  ) except  t h a t  t h e  s e t  {g I j  E K )  a t  S t ep  3  i s  i n  
k  f a c t  t h e  s e t  {Vz l (p  ) li= l , . . . , n ) .  I n  o t h e r  words, it uses  i n  
t h e  same way ( i . e .  f o r  computing a  d i r e c t i o n )  a l l  t h e  informat ion 
computed a t  pk ( t h e  Jacobian  ma t r ix )  i n s t e a d  of p a r t i a l  informa- 
t i o n  computed a t  p rev ious  s t e p s  (one l i n e  of t h e  Jacobian  a t  
i 
each p  ) . 
This  method i s  equ iva l en t  t o  Newton's method f o r  s o l v i n g  
t h e  system of i n e q u a l i t i e s  ( 3 ) ,  a s  de f ined  i n  [13 ] .  Correspond- 
i n g l y ,  it i s  shown i n  [ 7 ]  t o  be q u a d r a t i c a l l y  convergent ,  pro- 
vided t h e  hypotheses of  Theorem 1 a r e  s a t i s f i e d .  ITowever, i n  
t h e  p re sen t  s i t u a t i o n ,  it may f a i l  because t h e  excess  demands 
a r e  n o t  con t inuous ly  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e .  
I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  a t t r a c t i v e  t o  combine t h e  advantages of 
t h e s e  two methods, i n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  a  s a f e  method which con- 
verges  s u p e r l i n e a r l y  when t h e  problem i s  smooth enough. 
This  amounts t o  modifying S tep  2 of Algorithm 1  i n  t h e  
fol lowing manner: s e l e c t  an index s e t  K and t h e  corresponding 
s e t  of g r a d i e n t s  { g j ,  j  E K )  by t a k i n g  
- f i r s t  some s u b s e t  of  { ~ f ( ~ ~ ) , j =  1 ,  ..., k) 
k  
- and then  some subse t  of  {Vz! ( p  ) , i =  1 ,  ..., n )  . 
1 
We a r e  now s tudying  va r ious  s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  choosing K prop- 
e r l y ,  t h e  problem being t o  f i n d  a  good ba lance  between e f f i c i e n c y  
( r a p i d i t y )  and s a f e t y  (avoid ing  l o c a l  optima of  t h e  goa l  f u n c t i o n ) .  
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